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BUILDING BRIDGES AND
OVERCOMING BARRICADES:
EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LAW AS
AN AGENT OF TRANSFORMATIONAL
SOCIAL CHANGE
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.t

When the editors of this law review approached me regarding
the possibility of participating in this colloquium, I was somewhat
unsure about my ability to contribute something meaningful about
female circumcision.' As one who generally subscribes to Socrates'
admonition that recognizing and admitting one's intellectual limitations is a hallmark of wisdom,2 I usually try to avoid overstepping
my professional limitations.
In this particular instance, my professional limitations seemed
formidable. For example, I am not a medical doctor, nor am I
trained in anthropology or psychology. Similarly, although I main-

t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana. J.D., LLM.,
Duke University.
1. Those participating in discussions and debates regarding the practice of female circumcision do not even share a common nomenclature. Those most opposed to the practice
consistently refer to it as "female genital mutilation." On the other hand, many African
women (including Professor Obiora) prefer the term "female circumcision" to describe the
modification of the female genitalia through a variety of practices, running from sunna to
infibulation. See L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REy.
275, 287-89 (1997). I have elected to adopt Professor Obiora's nomenclature in this Re-

view Essay. This should not be interpreted to reflect, however, my approval or endorsement of the practice. Cf. Obiora, supra, at 289-90 (arguing that the term "female mutilation" does not accurately describe all forms of the practice and is offensive to some
African constituencies).
2. As Socrates put it, a truly wise man admits that his ability to "know" anything is
subject to significant doubts. See PLATO, THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES §§ 21-23, at 25-28
(Thomas G. West trans., 1979).
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tain an active interest in world affairs, I do not possess any special
expertise in the field of African studies. In short, I harbored some
significant doubts about my ability to contribute a useful perspective or point of view to this exchange.
Ultimately, I concluded that rather than focusing on the things
that I am not, I should instead attempt to bring to bear those skills
that accompany my training and profession. Whatever else I am
not, I am most certainly a lawyer and, notwithstanding the current
cycle of lawyer-bashing that is presently in vogue, I am proud of
my profession. I know and understand the operation of the law and
had the good fortune of practicing law for a number of years in a
well regarded law firm in Washington, D.C.
After giving the matter some thought, it seemed to me that a
(former) practicing lawyer's perspective is relevant to the ongoing
debate about the practice of female circumcision in certain African
cultures. After all, calls for the legislative abolition of the practice
necessarily assume that legislative action will accomplish the task;
once a law is on the books, the practice will cease. From a
lawyer's perspective, however, the law's power as an agent of
fundamental, transformational change has some rather concrete
limitations.
Effective legal reform, like politics, is the art of the possible.
As a general proposition, changing people's minds and beliefs is a
necessary prerequisite to altering their attitudes and behaviors
through modifications in the legal order. This is doubly true when
the attitudes and behaviors at issue incorporate and reflect deeply
held cultural values? As the maxim goes, "old habits die hard."

3. Speed limits in the United States provide a concrete example of this phenomenon.
Lowering the speed limit to 55 miles per hour ("mph") in response to the oil crises of
the 1970s did not alter the usual driving habits of most motorists. Moreover, many state
highway patrol officers did not strictly enforce the speed limit, generally affording motorists a zone of administrative grace of between five and nine miles per hour. Thus,
Congress' attempt to alter the driving habits of the American public failed, both as a
matter of changing the behavior of individual citizens and as an enforcement priority by
law enforcement officers. See generally JERRY L. MAsHAw & DAVID L. HARFsT, THE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 6-7 (1990) (noting that adoption of various federal statutes
and regulations have not resulted in safer roads); Stephen D. Sugarman, Nader's Failures?, 80 CAL. L. REv. 289, 289 (1992) (reviewing MASHAW & HARFST, supra); Michael
J. Trebilcock, Requiem for Regulators: The Passing of a Counter-culture, 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 497, 504-05 (1991).
Significantly, non-compliance was greatest in the western United States, whose long
expanses of sparsely populated land created a culture among Westerners that demanded a
higher speed limit. Ultimately, they prevailed on this matter, Congress abolished the feder-
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As it happens, I am also a Southerner. I grew up in Mississippi and know from personal experience the limitations of law as an
agent of social change. Even now, the dismantling of the Jim Crow
South remains something of a work in progress.4 The reason for
this is relatively simple; attitudes are very difficult to change, even
after the adoption and general acceptance of new legal rules that
restructure economic and political relations.
Given the social and cultural importance of female circumcision in certain African communities,5 the immediate adoption of
legislative proscriptions against the practice may have only a very
limited deterrent effect on ending it, just as the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not end the political, economic, and
social disempowerment of black citizens living in the American
South. An examination of American constitutional history will help
to demonstrate the limitations of law as an instrument of social
change. These lessons are germane to the project of eradicating the
practice of female circumcision.
Professor Obiora's article also emphasizes the importance of
culture in defining the specific content of particular human rights;
she asserts that Western human rights advocates have paid insufficient attention to the cultural importance of female circumcision
within the communities that observe the practice.6 Consistent with
these observations we see that legal rules in the United States often
incorporate cultural sensibilities, sometimes in arbitrary ways. Justice Antonin Scalia has repeatedly asserted that this is not an unfortunate reality, but a just and proper way of ordering our
society's laws.' Before we dismiss the cultural importance of a

ally-imposed speed limit in 1995. Meanwhile, Easterners living in urban areas continue to
shake their heads and wonder about the root causes of what they perceive to be the
recklessness and irresponsibility of speed-crazed Westerners. See Quentin Hardy, Westerners Rev Up to Speed Legally Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1995, at B1 (reporting that
the top speed on Western rural roads is 74.7 mph versus 64.1 mph for 85% of the cars
on the nation's roads).
4. As Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., one of the handful of courageous federal judges
who oversaw the dismantling of de jure segregation in the American South, observed in
the early 1990s: "Sometimes, I think we've come a long way on race, and sometimes, I
just don't know." JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LE AND TimE OF JUDGE
FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE SoUrTH's FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS, 470 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
5. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 295-98, 330 (discussing the role of female circumcision in various communities).
6. See id. at 283-87, 299-318.
7. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2679, 2682 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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practice that we find repugnant, we should first consider the culturally conditioned nature of that response. That the aversion reflects
our own cultural norms of moral propriety does not make the
aversion illegitimate; rather, it means that we should not be

shocked or appalled if other cultures do not so view the practice
from their moral perspective. American moral norms are not universal. Indeed, in some respects, our sense of justice could be
faulted rather seriously
Cases involving religious free exercise and the right of privacy
provide excellent exemplars of culturally-conditioned responses to
particular legal claims. An examination of these cases will demonstrate the limited nature of our ability to accept particular human
behaviors that deviate significantly from our own sense of what is
"normal."
Finally, I must confess that I do not fully understand the
practice of female circumcision and, moreover, that I find the
adverse health consequences associated with certain forms of the
practice simply horrifying.9 Nevertheless, Professor Obiora has
identified two crucial deficiencies in the West's campaign to abol-

(suggesting that "[firom our Nation's origin, prayer has been a prominent part of governmental ceremonies" and arguing that "maintaining respect for the religious observances of
others is a fundamental civic virtue that government (including the public schools) can
and should cultivate"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, .,
concurring) ("Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional
phrase, 'contra bonos mores', i.e., immoral.'); see also Clay Chandler, Scalia's Religion
Remarks: Just a Matter of Free Speech?, WAsH. POsT, Apr. 15, 1996, WASH. Bus., at 7
(discussing the impact of Scalia's Christian views on his judicial capacity to render unbiased decisions).
8. Virtually alone among major Western democracies, the United States does not provide universal access to health care. See Allyn Lise Taylor, Making the World Health
Organization Work: A Legal Foundation for Universal Access to the Conditions for
Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 306 (1992); Paul Starr, The Ideological War Over
Health Care, N.Y. TtMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at A21. Similarly, outside of a handful of despotic nations, the United States is virtually alone in maintaining the death penalty. See
Mary K. Newcomer, Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty in an International Context, 45
DUKE LJ. 611, 620-24 (1995). Our moral sense does not lead us to raise taxes to pay
for universal health care, nor has it compelied us to abolish capital punishment. A person
standing outside our culture might suggest that we fail to possess a "normal" or "adequate" moral sense. I do not think that this is necessarily so; rather, our culture finds it
acceptable that some people will go without health care and. that others will be put to
death by the state because such a state of affairs comports with our nation's innate sense
of justice and propriety.
9. See generally Obiora, supra note 1, at 291 (listing shock, gangrene, and septicemia
as among the potential health hazards).
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ish the practice. First, the West has failed to persuade women in
the societies observing the practice to abandon it. Second, it has
failed to take the time to learn precisely why so many African
mothers and daughters continue to observe the practice."0 As the
following materials will demonstrate, I largely concur with Professor Obiora's position that addressing these shortcomings successfully is an absolute prerequisite to securing meaningful reform.

I. EXPLORING LAW'S LIMITs
Ending racial apartheid in the American South tested the outer
limits of the law as an agent of fundamental, transformational
change. To be sure, legal transformations ultimately supported and
helped to facilitate broader social change. However, legal proscriptions standing alone failed to work transformational changes on an
unwilling populace." Instead, grass roots political agitation forced
changes in the legal order, in turn, these changes helped to facilitate further social transformation.
The example provided by the experience of the American
South in ending de jure segregation amply demonstrates that
transformational change must begin from within a society; it is the
product of internal, not external, pressure. This, in turn, seems to
support Professor Obiora's assertion that education and
clinicalization are likely to be far more effective tools at eradicating the untoward health effects associated with female circumcision
than either varied and creative expressions of international and/or
academic outrage or broadly drafted but ineffective domestic legal
proscriptions.'4
A. The American South
The American civil rights movement illustrates the necessary
relationship between successful social reform and grass roots commitments to change. Although Martin Luther King, Jr. has come to

10. See id. at 317-18.
11. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVL RIGHTS Acr, viii (1985).
12. See id. (recognizing that "presidential timidity and congressional indifference have
been shaken by dramatic events").
13. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 19, 62-68 (1990) (arguing that
compliance with the law is influenced by both the belief in the legitimacy of legal authority and personal morality).
14. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 350-64.
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symbolize this movement, his leadership would not have been
possible without the courage of hundreds of thousands of citizens;
citizens who individually and collectively decided that, regardless
of the personal costs, they would no longer acquiesce to the status
quo." Thus, while Martin Luther King, John Lewis, Joseph Lowery, and the other leaders of the civil rights movement were essential to its success, the real lifeblood of the movement was the
individual commitment of countless black Americans not only in
cities like Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma, but also in places
with less readily recognized names, like Albany, Baton Rouge, and
St. Augustine."
The success of the movement inhered in ordinary individuals
possessed of extraordinary courage, who simply stood up en masse
and refused to recognize the legal or moral authority of a society
that denied them basic civil rights. In the immortal words of Mrs.
Fannie Lou Hamer, they had become "'sick and tired of being sick
and tired.""' 7 Without the support of ordinary citizens, leaders like
Martin Luther King would never have been able to overcome the
entrenched white power structure that permeated the American
South and wielded considerable influence in both Congress and the
Democratic Party. As Julian Bond explained, it was only "[w]hen
people stopped waiting for someone else and formed their own
movement ' 'in the 1950s [that] the problem of legal segregation was
overcome. 8

15. See generally DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUrHER KING,
JR., AND THE SOuTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 48-82 (1986) (discussing
"mass effort" involved in the Montgomery bus boycott); Julian Bond, Introduction to
JuAN WILIAMs, EYES ON THE PRIzE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, at
xii-xv (1987) (discussing organized protests). As one civil rights activist later explained"Mhe movement made Martin rather than Martin making the movement" GARROW, supra, at 625.
16. The same forces that brought Dr. King to national prominence in Montgomery,
Alabama manifested themselves in countless other Southern cities and towns. See
GARROw, supra note 15, at 27, 81, 173, 316-18.
17. See KAY MILS, Tins L1rrLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE Lou HAmER
93 (1993). Fannie Lou Hamer was a principal organizer of both the Freedom Summer
voter registration project and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party ("MFDP"). See id.
at 97, 108. Under the glare of the national press' kleig lights, the MFDP challenged the
credentials of the all-white Mississippi delegation at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. See id at 131-32. The daughter of a Mississippi sharecropper, Hamer's transformation from victim to activist is one of the most compelling stories of the movement.
See generally WILIAMS, supra note 15, at 228-49 (discussing the development of Fannie
Lou Hamer's role in the civil rights movement).
18. BOND, supra note 15, at xiii.

19971

THE LIMITS OF LAW

429

Consider, for example, the Montgomery bus boycott of 195556, which launched Dr. King into a national leadership role in the
civil rights movement.' 9 Rather than continue to suffer the indignities of segregation, average citizens virtually abandoned the
Montgomery public transportation system and chose either to walk
or to rely on an elaborate car pooling system organized within the
black community."e The success of the boycott was a function of
the commitment of the community to the project; the broad-based
support of the black community forced the white Montgomery
power structure to break. In the face of similar boycotts, other
Alabama cities, like Mobile, simply abandoned the formal, enforced
segregation of their public transportation systems.2 '
Not surprisingly, the Montgomery bus boycott has come to
represent the birth of the modem civil rights movement. In many
respects, the Montgomery bus boycott stands to the American civil
rights movement as the Battle of Concord stands to the American
Revolution; it constituted a kind of "shot heard 'round the world."
Virtually every school child in the nation knows that on December
1, 1955, Mrs. Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a Montgomery city bus. In addition to its undeniable symbolic and historic importance, however, the Montgomery bus boycott also demonstrates the critical importance of broad-based community support to
the success of the American civil rights movement.
It is certainly true that, following events like the Montgomery
bus boycott and the Selma-to-Montgomery march, the civil rights
movement benefitted from "outside" intervention in the form of
federal legislation. Thus, one cannot deny that federal law played
an essential role in the transformation of the South.= However,

19. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTiNG THE WATERS: AMEmCA IN THE KING YEARS 195463, at 203-05 (1988) ("After the boycott, the mantle of fame fell ever more personally on
King. .. "); WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 73-89.
20. See BASS, TAMING THE STORM, supra note 4, at 95-113 (1993); GARROW, supra
note 15, at 26-29, 51-59, 75-82; JACK BASS, UNLKELY HEROES, 56-83 (1981).

21. See GARROW, supra note 15, at 26, 52, 70 (discussing the "first-come, first-seated"
policy as a form of compromise). See also WILLIAMS,

supra note 15, at 60-61, 89

(same).
22. In fact, federal judicial intervention facilitated some of the mass protests that, in

turn, precipitated significant (and effective) broad-based legal reforms, such as the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. See GARRow, supra note 15, at 357-430. See also Williams v.
Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 110 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (enjoining the state from interfering
with plaintiffs' proposed march); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The
Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L. 1411, 1412 (1995) (arguing that the Selma march prompted Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
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this role was largely reactive. Federal intervention did not precipitate local activism, but instead followed it. "Outside" intervention

worked only after local efforts created the conditions that forced
changes in the legal system.
President Eisenhower's intervention at Little Rock's Central
High School on September 24, 1957 provides an excellent illustra-

tion of this phenomenon. President Eisenhower did not force integration on Little Rock, Arkansas at the point of a bayonet; instead,
local parents in Little Rock demanded that their children enjoy
access to a desegregated public education.'s Average people with
above average courage demanded that Brown v. Board of Educadon24 be more than a moral platitude.' Considered in context,
President Eisenhower's use of federal force at Little Rock's Central
High School was the product of local activism, not the cause of

it.0
Similarly, local voter registration efforts and mass protests led
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, despite local officials who sometimes met these efforts with mere intransigence and
at other times with shocking brutality.' Boycotts and mass protests in Birmingham coupled with the crushing force used by local
authorities to suppress them led to passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 19 6 4 .' Consistent with this pattern, passage of the Voting

Rights Act of 1965 followed the Selma-to-Montgomery march; it
did not precipitate it.29 Indeed, every significant legal step on the
23. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 8 (1958) (refusing to suspend school board's
court-approved desegregation program which a "large majority of the residents" had supported).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8 (noting the residents' belief that the desegregation plan
was "still the best for the interests of all pupils in the district").
26. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROEs, supra note 20, at 149-155; see generally BRANCH, supra
note 19, at 222-25 (discussing the "Little Rock crisis"); GARROW, supra note 15, at 98,
119 (noting that the Little Rock crisis brought the issue of segregation "'to the forefront
of the conscience of the nation"'); CHIEF JUSTIcE EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL
WARREN 291 (1977) (noting Eisenhower's failure to take a definitive stand on desegregation); WILLAMS, supra note 15, at 91-119 (same).
27. See generally BRANCH, supra note 19, at 485-86; JoHN HOPE FRANKIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS
439-40 (6th ed. 1988); GARROW, supra note 15, at 127-38.
28. See BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra note 20, at 201-12; GARRow, supra note 15,
at 249-50, 267-69; BRANCH, supra note 19, at 795-802; WHALEN & WALEN, supra note
11, at xvii-xx, 227-29.
29. See DAVID i. GARRow, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS Acr OF 1965 133-78 (1978); See also Krotoszynski, supra note 22, at
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road to dismantling the Jim Crow South followed acts of social
protest by individual citizens living under the system.3
Again, I do not mean to suggest that law played no role in
the transformation of the South. On the contrary, law was essential
to the success of the movement. In particular, federal judges like
Frank M. Johnson, Jr., J. Skelly Wright, John Minor Wisdom,
Elbert P. Tutle, Richard W. Rives, and John R. Brown demanded
that Southern state governments observe the rule of law, often at
great personal risk' The undeniable fact, however, is that legal
reforms neither precipitated nor maintained the American civil
rights movement
Indeed, if law itself were capable of working such change,
segregation should have come to an end swiftly after passage of
the Civil War Amendments.32 As we all know, the Fourteenth
Amendment did not, as if by magic, transform the South in the
aftermath of the Civil War. Instead, generations after the adoption
of constitutional amendments that ostensibly guaranteed basic civil
rights to all citizens regardless of race,33 black Southerners transformed their region by demanding that they be granted the equal
protection of the laws, including suffrage.
In sum, changes in the law were certainly a necessary condition for the success of the American civil rights movement, but
they plainly were not a sufficient condition for transformation or
fundamental change. 4 When meaningful reform finally came, it

1412, 1427 (discussing the impact of the Selma march).
30. Even the Supreme Court decisions dismantling "separate but equal" education facilities were the product of local activism, rather than the precipitating event for such activism. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 487 (1954) ("[M]inors of the Negro
race . . .seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their
community on a nonsegregated basis."); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950)
(challenging a race-based denial of admission to a state law school); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (same); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 1-35.
31. See BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra note 20, at 23-56, 78-82, 112-35; see also
BASS, TAMING THE STORm, supra note 4, at 118-31, 142-72.
32. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN NEGROES 293-338 (1948) (discussing reconstruction); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN,
RECONSTRUCTON AFrER THE CIVIL WAR 53-83, 152-73, 168-69, 194-219 (Daniel J.
Boorstin ed., 2d ed. 1994) (discussing the inadequacy of federal enforcement laws to
protect African-American citizens).
33. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (ffIarlan, J., dissenting) ("Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.").
34. South Africa provides a second example of the importance of local activism as a
precondition to social reform. The end of Herrenvolk democracy in South Africa was
much more the product of the individual commitment of millions of black South Africans
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had much more to do with the dreams and aspirations of millions

of black Americans than with the legal regime established by the
"radical" Republicans whb served in Congress during the late
1860s and early 1870s."
B. Lessons for the Campaign Against Female Circumcision

Professor Obiora has set forth a powerful indictment of the
effectiveness of both international pressure and domestic legislation
to end the practice of female circumcision. The failure of both the
international human rights community and domestic governments to
make significant progress toward eradicating the practice of female

circumcision reflects the fact that many (and perhaps most) women
in the affected cultures and subcultures do not view the practice as

"mutilation." As Professor Obiora reports, "most studies on female
circumcision seldom articulate personal discontent by its 'vic-

tims."' 36 Furthermore "there has been no significant decline in the
practice," reflecting a decision by "those directly affected by the
issue [to] remain faithful to their traditional obligation to circumcise."37

So long as those with the most direct interest in the abolition
of the practice continue to view it as central to their cultures, it
seems highly unlikely that legal reforms alone will have a meaningful impact on the incidence of female circumcision. If history is
any guide, attempts at legal prohibition in the absence of educa-

to achieving full and equal citizenship than it was the global community's repeated statements of outrage regarding the immorality of the apartheid system. As current President
Nelson Mandela explains in his autobiography: "Oliver Tambo and the ANC had called
for the people of South Africa to render the country ungovernable, and the people were
obliging." NELsON R. MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
NELSON MANDELA 461 (1994). Frustrated by generations of oppression, "[t]he anger of
the masses was unrestrained; the townships were in upheaval." Id. As in the case of the
American South, the incredible bravery of ordinary citizens was the principal cause of the
collapse of a racist and oppressive system of government. See id., at 451-56, 461, 477-81,
484-86, 490-505; see also DAVID OTrAWAY, CHAINED TOGETMER: MANDELA, DE KLERK,
AND THE STRUGGLE TO REMAKE SOUTH AFRICA (1993); CRUCIBLE OF FIRE THE CHURCH
CONFRONTS APARTHEID ix-xiii, 23-31, 33-39 (Jim Wallis & Joyce Hollyday eds., 1989)
(Foreword by Allan Boesak).
35. Cf. FRANKLIN & Moss, supra note 27, at 436-70 (describing the substantial progress toward equality that black Americans achieved during the "black revolution" years of
the 1950s to the 1970s); see generally FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL
WAR, supra note 32, at 89-219; FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM, supra note 32,
at 320-338.
36. Obiora, supra note 1, at 317.
37. aId
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tional campaigns and/or efforts to ameliorate the cultural impact of
prohibition are doomed to failure."
This should not come as a surprise. In the absence of a community consensus that a particular practice or custom is unacceptable, a legal prohibition is unlikely to be effective in altering traditional behaviors.39 Professor Obiora makes a compelling case for
the proposition that, at least at present, a consensus does not exist
within the relevant communities that female circumcision constitutes a social evil. Reformers would do well to address this state
of affairs before demanding strong legal interventions.
For transformation through legal reform to be possible, there
must first be local support for such change. It seems highly unlikely that the law is capable of unilaterally obliterating a practice
deeply ingrained in the cultural and legal systems of a number of
African nations. It is highly doubtful that an approach to reform
based on condemning female circumcision and insisting on its
immediate legal abolition will prove successful in eradicating the
practice, any more than the Civil War and passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments ended Southern
apartheid in the United States. At best, the legal prohibition might
go unenforced, and, at worst, the prohibition might drive the practice "underground."'
The real challenge is formulating a plan of constructive engagement that educates African women and men about the dangers
associated with the practice of female circumcision and the reasons
that the practice should be abandoned. Simply condemning the
practice as "evil" and "immoral" is unlikely to provoke much
debate within the relevant cultures.4 1

38. See id. at 329-32; see also TYLER, supra note 13, at 19-39, 173-78 (recognizing
that people evaluate laws and legal authority in normative terms).
39. See TYLER, supra note 13, at 22-30, 64-68, 176-78 (discussing the ineffectiveness
of social control mechanisms); see also JAMES C. SCoTr, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT REsISTANCE 28-47 (1985) (discussing the effectiveness of the
"ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups").
40. See Neil MacFarquhar, Mutilation of Egyptian Girls: Despite Ban, It Goes On,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1996, at A3 (noting concern that practice will be increasingly performed "behind closed doors"); see also Obiora, supra note 1, at 87 (discussing same).
41. Indeed, such an approach evokes former First Lady Nancy Reagan's remonstration
to the nation's youth to "Just Say No" to drugs. The drug culture that presently blights
communities in the United States has myriad causes and will not vanish upon the recitation of the "Just Say No" mantra. A legal prohibition on the sale and use of crack cocaine will never eradicate its use in the absence of sophisticated social welfare experiments aimed at reorienting the dreams and aspirations of inner city youth. Cf. James W.
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Imagine, if you will, attempting to ban a widespread practice
in the United States that is known to be deleterious to healthsmoking. Would a ban on the sale and/or possession of tobacco
products eradicate the consumption of such products? Without
conducting field research on the question, I think it highly doubtful
that a flat prohibition would prove successful.42 The American
constitutional experiment with Prohibition43 provides a compelling
historical example of a failed attempt to use law to reshape society
in a fundamental way. Although Westerners may have difficulty
accepting the material equivalency of, on the one hand, a beer and
a cigarette and, on the other, female circumcision, in cross-cultural
terms a material equivalency may exist with respect to the inefficacy of legal prohibition as a regulatory paradigm.'
Within the cultures that practice female circumcision, the
practice is simply a cultural fact-not unlike the cultural fact of
smoking and drinking in the United States.4' That we perceive the
human costs associated with that cultural fact to be significantly
higher than those associated with the use of tobacco or alcohol
does not alter the salience or relevance of female circumcision
within the cultures that observe the practice. As Professor Obiora
notes, our reaction to female circumcision is a function of our
cultural sensibilities.'
Body piercing provides an illustration of the diversity of acceptable cultural practices. In the United States, piercing has become a pop culture phenomenon: tongues, nipples, noses, eyebrows, and, yes, even genitalia are now festooned with various
kinds of metal studs.47 No hue and cry has been raised; no broadFox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The Troubling Case of
Workfare, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 103, 170 (1996) (arguing that welfare policy should reflect
the "multiple spheres" that influence self-worth).
42. This has certainly proven to be the case in prisons that have attempted to ban the
consumption of tobacco products. See Henriette Campagne, What's Up on the Hill: Smoking Ban at Prisons Draws Fire, MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 17, 1996, at A27; Gordon
Smith, Will Inmates See the Light Over Smoking Ban?, SAN DmIGo UNION-TRIB., Mar. 22,
1993, at A2; Michelle Quinn, Smoking Ban a Problem for Prisons, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Feb. 24, 1993, at A14.
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.

44. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 371 ("[A] woman from a circumcising culture may
well reject circumcision at the risk of a loss of status, respect, and support within her
own group.").

45. See, e.g., MacFarquhar, supra note 40 (noting that female circumcision is grounded
in culture).
46. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 318-22.
47. See Laura Blumenfeld, Holier Than Thou, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1993, at Fl; see

19971

THE LIMITS OF LAW

435

based movement demanding the legislative abolition of body piercing has arisen. In a pluralistic society that largely adheres to a
Millsian liberty ethic, one man's vulgarity can serve as another's

body decoration." Our cultural sensibilities condition our response
to a particular practice, just as our cultural sensibilities largely
control our attraction (or aversion) to certain foods.
By no means do I equate body piercing with female circumci-

sion-especially in its more extreme forms.49 A particularly relevant distinction is the notion of choice: female infants and young
girls often do not enjoy the luxury of electing or not electing to be
"circumcised." In the absence of meaningful choice, the practice
constitutes an extreme and unjustifiable form of physiological denial. ° I am suggesting, however, that our own sense of outrage at

the practice may not be shared by those who have the most direct
interest in
necessarily
culturalized
fication of

its eradication and that this state of affairs does not
reflect badly on African women who have been
to embrace the practice as a natural and normal moditheir bodies 5 ' In the absence of a decision by African

women themselves to abandon the practice, the expressions of
outrage emanating from international conferences on human rights
will do little to change the attitudes or expectations of African

women and men toward female circumcision.

also Alex Kershaw, FutureSex: The Final Frontier, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 22, 1995, at
30; Trish Hall, Piercing Fad Is Turning Convention on Its Ear, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
1991, §1, at 38.
48. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (holding that free
speech rights protect the display of vulgarity on a jacket, even though it may offend a
large portion of the population). Certainly, this seems to he the personal philosophy of*
basketball superstar Dennis Rodman. See DENNIs RODMAN, BAD AS I WANT TO BE
(1996).
49. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 287-89.
50. The Supreme Court, however, has permitted Amish parents to make fundamental
life choices for their children, without regard to whether the children would, if given the
choice, make the same choice. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972). But
cf id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that parents should not be permitted to
make life-altering choices for their children).
51. I agree, however, with Professor Obiora that it is insulting to suggest that all African women are cultural "dupes" and therefore cannot he assumed to exercise any meaningful personal agency. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 302-05. Indeed, one would be hard
pressed to disagree with her observation that "[the basic discovery of feminist studies is
that women, insofar as they are oppressed of a culture, are rarely oblivious of their grievances." Id. at 315. It is also seems doubtful that African mothers would willingly subject
their daughters to circumcision in the absence of strong cultural reasons supporting (perhaps even demanding) the practice. See id. at 295-98, 316-18.
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This suggests that Professor Obiora's proposals for reform,
including clinicalization of the practice and broad-based educational
efforts, are imminently reasonable! 2 Her agenda for change begins
with modifying the attitudes of African women themselves 3 and,
in the interim, ameliorating the worst effects of the practice. 4 Efforts of this sort are an absolute precondition to the effectiveness
of legal proscriptions against female circumcision.
Law as an agent of social reform has concrete limitations; one
cannot rewrite by legislative fiat the content of people's hearts and
minds. Only after African women themselves begin to question the
legitimacy of female circumcision, can law play an important role
in accelerating the rate of change. While Professor Obiora does not
reject legal proscriptions as an element of a comprehensive reform
program, 5 she questions the ability of law, standing alone, to unseat long and deeply held cultural values.56 The lessons of American constitutional and political history amply justify her skepticism
regarding law's ability to effect fundamental social reforms in the
absence of grass roots support for such transformations.

II. CONSTrrUTIONAL TOLERANCES (AND INTOLERANCES): A
LESSON IN COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS

Although Professor Obiora plainly supports reform efforts
aimed at eliminating the adverse health effects associated with
female circumcision,57 she also challenges the reader to reconsider
the Western human rights community's complete and unqualified
condemnation of the practice.58 Obiora's objections are not a defense or justification of the practice, but rather as a plea for the
West to consider the cultural significance and status of the practice.59 In this regard, she asks why forms of body modification

52. See generally id. at 361-76.
53. See id. at 361-62.

54. See id. at 365-67 (urging clinicalization for all future circumcisions).
55. See id. at 357-58.

56. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 357-60 (questioning the effectiveness of laws in the
face of cost of enforcement and lack of voluntary compliance).
57. See id. at 357-58 (urging clinicalization).
58. See id. at 292-98 (discussing the history and cultural significance of circumcision
to those who practice it); see also id. at 303-05 (arguing that the Western view of African women as subjugated to men is inaccurate and that African women possess initiative
and self-reliance).
59. See id. at 305-06.
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practiced in the West do not implicate universalist human rights
norms, whereas similar practices in traditional African cultures are
"fetishized" and subjected to broad-based condemnation and calls
for legislative prohibition.'
Professor Obiora is no doubt correct to posit that the revulsion
expressed by Western critics of female circumcision is a product of
their socialization and culture.61 This state of affairs is not particularly surprising; like legal norms, moral norms do not exist in a
cultural vacuum. Even in the United States, culture shapes and
defines the moral sense of both lawmakers and judges. In turn, the
moral sensibilities of legislators and judges affect the community's
legal order.62
A. The Free Exercise Clause: Culture Shaping Law
The Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment 3 provides
an excellent example of the impact of cultural sensibilities and
biases on the legal order. Historically, the Supreme Court has
refused to interpret the Free Exercise clause to protect the religious
practices of unpopular religious minorities. Thus, in Reynolds v.
United States,' the Court squarely rejected a free exercise challenge brought by Mormons against a federal prohibition on bigamy.' The court stated,
[L]aws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices....

60. See id. at 318-22.
61. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 314-16 (discussing the effect of a culture on the
views held by its members).
62. For example, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia appears to believe that federal judges
should bring their personal moral and religious sense to bear when executing their official
duties. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Chandler, supra note 7 (discussing whether Scalia's
defense of Christianity, delivered at a Baptist prayer breakfast, demonstrates an inability to

remain impartial).
63. See U.S CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .
64. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
65. See id. at 166-67; see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding
Idaho voting law that required that the voter did not belong to any group advocating
bigamy or polygamy).
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Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of
his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself.66
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this view of the Free
Exercise clause in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.' The court in Smith affirmed the
denial of unemployment compensation benefits to Native Americans
who were fired from their drug counselling positions because they
regularly ingested peyote-a practice consistent with their religious
beliefs but illegal under state law. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia opined that "[tihe government's ability to enforce generally
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability
to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on the
measuring effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector's spiritual development." '
Congress has taken a somewhat broader view of the religious
prerogatives of the citizenry, enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (the "RFRA")69 to overturn legislatively the
rule announced in Smith.70 Under the RFRA, a legislative enactment that burdens a religious practice must serve a compelling
state interest to be valid as applied against the religious practice.7
It essentially creates a presumption that religious minorities may
engage in otherwise prohibited conduct in order to satisfy their
religious obligations. 2

66. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
67. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
68. Ld.at 885 (quoting Lying v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Assn., 485 U.S.
439, 451 (1988)).
69. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (1993)).
70. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 895 (1994).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b); see also Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538, 1541

(S.D. Fla. 1994) (applying compelling interest test as required by RFRA to prison policy
of literature censorship), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d

502 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that new prison policy did not violate compelling interest
test and trial court erred by refusing to consider new policy); Allah v. Mnei, 844 F.
Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that compelling interest test now applies to all

state statutes that burden religious practice).
72. The federal courts have not yet spoken to the possible application of the RFRA to
female circumcision. It would seem, however, that persons from cultures practicing female
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If Smith and Reynolds reflected a consistent line of jurisprudence, one might credibly argue that the meaning of the Free Exercise clause is not culturally contingent. However, these cases do
not reflect an unbroken and consistent jurisprudence. In Wisconsin
v. Yoder,' the Supreme Court held that Amish children could not

be compelled to attend high school. 4 Although Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law constituted a "neutral" law of general appli-

cability (i.e., the obligation to attend secondary school applied to
all minors within the state and the Wisconsin legislature did not
pass the law in order to burden any particular religious minority75), the Supreme Court nevertheless exempted Amish children

from its application.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Yoder clearly reflects unbrided admiration for the Amish people's yeoman-farmer lifestyle:
Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by the majority, this
record strongly shows that the Amish community has been

a highly successful social unit within our society, even if
apart from the conventional "mainstream." Its members are
productive and very law-abiding members of society; they

reject public welfare in any of its usual modem forms.
....
Indeed, the Amish communities singularly parallel
and reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal of the
"sturdy yeoman" who would form the basis of what he
considered as the ideal of a democratic society. Even their

circumcision could attempt to use the RFRA as a shield to possible prosecutions arising
from circumcising their daughters. (Editor's Note: This comment was written before Congress criminalized female circumcision in the United States. See generally James T.Dixon,
Introduction, 47 CASE W. RES. L.REV. 263, 266 n.14 (1997) (describing the prohibited
acts under the new law).) Whether this will remain the case after the Supreme Court
issues its decision in Flores v. City of Boerne remains to be seen. See 73 F.3d 1352 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074) (reversing
trial court's holding that RFRA is unconstitutional and finding that Congress had power to
enact RFRA without violating separation of powers doctrine or First and Tenth Amendments); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 439-45 (1994) (arguing
that the RFRA should be deemed unconstitutional for at least three reasons, notably including the RFRA's implicit assumption that Congress may legislatively override the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause).
73. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
74. Id. at 234.
75. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-47 (1993) (overturning city ordinance prohibiting ritual slaughter of animals on
grounds that ordinance's lack of neutrality impermissibly infringed on religious rights).
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idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the diversity we
profess to admire and encourage.76
Would a majority of the justices have been as solicitous of the free

exercise claims of a group of Rastafarians who wished to establish
a commune in violation of a local zoning ordinance? I suspect that
they would not.' The decision in Yoder reflects and incorporates
cultural assumptions about the moral worth of the Old Order
Amish: A majority of the Supreme Court viewed the Amish way
of life as consistent with dominant community paradigms-notably
including the Protestant work ethic. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Free Exercise clause to protect this religious
minority from the unintended consequences of the Wisconsin compulsory attendance laws.
The First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion
permits some deviance from community norms; the degree and
kind of deviance permitted under Yoder (and now the RFRA) will
be a function of the cultural sensibilities of individual federal judges. Thus, the substantive meaning of the "right to free exercise" is
(at least in part) culturally determined. Moreover, this observation
is not intended to be a criticism of Yoder, the RFRA, or any individual jurist. The substantive content of many rights is culturally
dependent; one's sense of justice is necessarily something of a
function of one's cultural norms.8

76. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222, 225-26; cf id. at 246-47, 247 n.5 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's reliance on the "law and order" record of the Amish people and
asking rhetorically "how the Catholics, Episcopalians, the Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
the Unitarians, and [his] own Presbyterians would make out if subjected to such a test").
77. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-85,
890 (1990) (discussing cases in which religious motivations did not automatically merit
exemption from neutral laws of general application).
78. For example, the Japanese Supreme Court has tolerated higher levels of government
regulation of indecent and obscene materials than has the Supreme Court of the United
States. See Ishii v. Japan (the de Sade Case), 23 Keishu 10 at 1239 (High Ct. 1969),
reprinted in HIRosm ITOH & LAWRENCE W. BEER, THE CONSTrmONAL CASE LAW OF
JAPAN: SELECrED SuPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70 183 (1978); Judgment Upon Case
of Translation and Publication of Lady- Chatterley's Lover and Article 175 of the Penal
Code (1957), reprinted in SAIKO SAIBANSHO, 2 SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT UPON QUESTIONS OF CONsTITUTIONALnY; see also LAWRENCE W. BEER,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN 335-61 (1984) (discussing the Japanese Supreme
Court's treatment of obscenity cases). This does not mean that the Japanese Constitution's
guarantee of free speech is meaningless, but rather means that the Japanese conception of
the "freedom of speech" happens to differ from that of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
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B. Tradition, Culture, and the Right of Privacy
The Supreme Court's approach to the right to privacy also
illustrates the close relationship between culture and law. In a
79 the Suseries of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,
preme Court has recognized a sphere of personal autonomy that
includes the right to substantial personal discretion in matters pertaining to intimate associations and procreation, up to and including
the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy."
Notwithstanding its earlier precedents endorsing the view that
the constitutional right of privacy conferred substantial discretion
on individual citizens in ordering their intimate associations, in
Bowers v. Hardwick"' the Supreme Court held that Georgia could
constitutionally criminalize sex between persons of the same sex.'
Writing for the five-justice majority, Justice White emphasized the
long history of the legislative proscriptions against homosexual
sodomy and placed strong reliance on these proscriptions to justify
excluding this behavior from the right of privacy."
Going back even further in time, Chief Justice Burger, concurring separately, cited "Judeao-Christian moral and ethical" prohibitions on homosexual conduct as evidence supporting the majority's
decision." In the Chief Justice's view, because the prohibition
against same-sex intimate associations had "ancient roots" reaching
back to the time of the Roman Empire, the right of privacy could
not plausibly be interpreted to protect such conduct.'
It is certainly possible to distinguish heterosexual and homosexual intimate associations, and to afford constitutional protection to
the former but not to the later. The distinction, however, does not
rest on any legal grounds, but rather reflects and incorporates deeply held cultural values about human sexual behavior.

79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (briefly examining the Court's
previous privacy rulings).
81. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
82. See id. at 196.
83. See id. at 192 n.5-6, 194 (listing state laws prohibiting sodomy in effect when the
Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Fourteenth Amendment were enacted and concluding that
these laws indicate that a right to sodomy is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition").
84. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
85. Id.
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Although the Supreme Court had recognized a generalized right
of privacy, which may encompass the right to engage in extramarital intercourse,86 the cultural norm against homosexual conduct
justified an exception from the general rule that government cannot
regulate intimate associations." Like Reynolds, Bowers is an example of a majority of the Supreme Court enforcing its conception
of contemporary community mores. The content of the legal rule,
in this case the right of privacy, reflected and incorporated certain

cultural values and assumptions.
C. On Culture, Difference, and Human Rights
The foregoing discussion of the Supreme Court's implementation of the Free Exercise clause and the right of privacy demonstrates the close relationship between law and culture; legal norms
do not exist free and clear of cultural expectations. Accordingly, it
seems to me that Professor Obiora is correct to challenge us to
consider the cultural context in which female circumcision is practiced and to recognize that this context is quite different from that
of the United States in the late twentieth century.88 Even if nonWestern governments agree to protect "human rights," this does not
necessarily mean that the content of those rights will be identical
to those protected in the West. Moreover, this state of affairs does
not necessarily imply a moral or legal inferiority on the part of the
non-Western governments or cultures. Some care should be taken
before applying Western concepts of personal rights and autonomy
to traditional African societies.89
Of course, even permitting traditional African societies an
ample margin of appreciationr to account for the wide disparities
86. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the denial of contraceptives to unmarried persons violates the equal protection clause since it infringes a privacy

right).
87. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
88. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 295-98 (discussing several cultures in which circumci-

sion is practiced).
89. In this regard, one of the more salient distinctions that Professor Obiora identifies
is the organic concept of culture that evidently exists in traditional African societies. See
id. at 292-93, 295. Western rights discourse is firmly grounded on Lockean social contract
theory of the state; the notion of the community as an organic whole is largely foreign to
this woridview.
90. The phrase "margin of appreciation" has a rich history in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights and is a helpful way of conceptualizing Professor
Obiora's admonition to consider the cultural sensibilities of African women and men. The
European Court uses the term to describe the deference that it permits signatories to the
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that exist in cultural sensibilities, one nevertheless could conclude
that the practice of female circumcision violates fundamental human rights and must therefore be abolished. One can agree with
Professor Obiora's position that culture must be taken into account
before applying normative standards of conduct to particular cultures without ultimately abandoning opposition to the practice of

female circumcision.
Professor Obiora is calling the West to task for judging traditional African societies without first giving adequate consideration
to the importance of local customs and practices and the role that
they play in structuring both individuals and whole communities.
She posits that the West (and Western feminists in particular)
suffer from the same malady that afflicted Lewis Carroll's Queen
of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland: a predisposition to judge without
first having and weighing all of the relevant facts.9 The consequences of this state of affairs are terribly high, for by condemning
without first understanding, the West has failed to make a credible
case for abolition to those most directly affected by the practice of
female circumcision.

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by balancing local
cultural traditions against the need to recognize and enforce minimum human rights. See
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EuR. H.R. REP. 149, 164-67 (1981) (describing the
court's use of "margin of appreciation" in balancing North Ireland's interest in prohibiting
homosexual relations against general human rights); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2
EuR. H.R. REP. 245, 276 (1979) (stating that "margin of appreciation" is not absolute and
court retains power to review); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 EuR. H.R. REP. 1, 10-11
(1978) (balancing local interests in favor of corporal punishment against general interest in
avoiding "degrading" punishment); see also MiRELLE DELMAS-MARTY, THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTE CTON OF HUMAN RIGHTS 330-34 (1992); J.G. MERRms,
Tim DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 144-49 (1988). Notwithstanding a general consensus among the signatory states
that a particular practice, such as corporal punishment, violates the rights and liberties
safeguarded by the convention, a member state may argue that its local customs and
traditions justify a derogation from the European community's norm. See id. at 133; P.
VAN DuK & GJ.H. vAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 421-49 (1984). The margin of appreciation does not guarantee that the
state claiming its benefit will escape liability under the convention; it merely ensures that
the European Court will give some consideration to local sensibilities before enforcing
community-wide standards on a signatory state. See DELMAS-MARTY, supra, at 333;
MERRIS, supra, at 132. But c VAN DaK & VAN HOOF, supra, at 604-06 (arguing that
the margin of appreciation has been taken so far that no principals are now fully protected).
91. As the Queen of Hearts so eloquently puts it, "Sentence first-verdict afterwards!"
LEWIs CARROLL, AlICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 116 (Henry Holt and Co. 1985);
cf. Obiora, supra note 1, at 292-95, 298-99.
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Only by recognizing that our instinctive reaction to the practice
of female circumcision reflects and incorporates its utter foreignness can the West hope to make a credible case for reform. By
recognizing that the content of our own rights discourse is culturally defined, we can begin to attempt to understand the role that
female circumcision plays in traditional African cultures. In this
regard, the free exercise and privacy cases demonstrate how culture
shapes (and sometimes controls) legal and moral understandings
and expectations.
In short, Professor Obiora challenges the West to step back and
reconsider its attempts to apply its moral and legal reasoning in a
linear fashion to African women living in pre-industrial agrarian
societies. Her point is a good one and demands a serious response
by those most opposed to the practice of female circumcision.
III. CONCLUSION

Professor Obiora has challenged the West to rethink its campaign against female circumcision, on the grounds that current
efforts to eradicate the practice are both ineffective and culturally
myopic. Both of these criticisms seem to be well-founded. At the
same time, I find myself in complete agreement with Western
feminists' and the international human rights community's demand
that the adverse health effects associated with female circumcision
must be addressed expeditiously. It seems to me, however, that one
can acknowledge the validity of Professor Obiora's observations
without uncritically embracing the practice of female circumcision.
Indeed, one could (and perhaps should) interpret Professor Obiora's
overall project not as a general defense of female circumcision, but
rather as a plea for greater cultural sensitivity on the part of the
West. Such sensitivity will be crucial to building the necessary
consensus for reform within the affected communities-a step that
I believe is an absolute prerequisite to effective legislative reforms.
In sum, the Western human rights community must recognize the
limits of law as an agent of social change; in so doing, it can urge
a platform of reform that successfully utilizes law as an important
(but not self-sufficient) element of comprehensive social and cultural change.

